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Keynote Speaker

A Transcript Featuring the 1999-

2000 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lecturer-Floyd Abrams

PROFESSOR BLUMOFF: Can I get your attention a minute? Thank
you. I don't do this well in a class.
Let me welcome you to the 1999-2000 Symposium-Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise Symposium and Lectureship. And I think it's appropriate before I start that a few thank yous go out. First, and she's not here
because her daughter was in an accident yesterday, to Yonna Shaw. I
have seen-known Yonna for years and years just passing her in the hall
and nodding and saying hello. I didn't realize until the last couple of
months, until I actually worked with her, what a resource she is for the
Law School. Her energy and her ability to keep eight thousand balls in
the air at any given time is fantastic. Her sense of humor is wonderful.
And although she's not here, I can tell you without Yonna's incredible
attention to detail, this would not have happened. So I certainly thank
her for helping me and the rest of us bring this about. I'm just sorry
she's not here.
I want to thank Elizabeth Brown and the Law School, the Law Review
people who have helped all the way through to organize this. And I
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hope that the program itself is as valuable as the help I received
preparing this.
Let me give you a little background to the Holmes process. About two
years ago, the Dean stuck a flyer in my mailbox, I guess. It was a call
for proposals to sponsor the Holmes lectureship. For those of you who
don't know, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes died about almost seventy
years ago and left his money to the United States Government. Now,
nobody does that these days. They immediately took the money,
Congress did, and appointed a committee, headed by the Librarian of
Congress, to figure out what to do with his legacy. The first thing they
did was produce a multi-volume history of the United States Supreme
Court by Charles Fairman, which is still routinely cited as a dispositive
history of the United States Supreme Court.
And then beginning sometime in the '40s they started sponsoring an
annual lectureship. It went on for about twenty years, and for some
reason that I really don't know, in the mid '60s it stopped, and it stopped
for about twenty years. Sometime in the mid '80s, and I suspect it was
with a new Librarian of Congress, they started up the lectureship again.
And I want to say that we are in a distinguished line of schools who
have been awarded this lectureship. And when we made the proposal,
and then sometime later told them who we were bringing to speak, they
were delighted. The Librarian of Congress and the Trustees who
administer the program were very happy, so we are really pleased and
honored to have the people with us who will be speaking this weekend.
The topic of the symposium is The Marketplace of Ideas in Cyberspace.
The marketplace of ideas is a metaphor that came from a dissent in an
opinion by Justice Holmes as a dissenter in 1919 called Abrams v.
United States.' And I'l leave some of the nuances aside and just point
out that the whole notion of a marketplace of ideas was to replace
government regulation as the way ideas get tested. And, so, he-his
proposal was rather than putting this, as he put it, poor puny socialist
in jail, let's let his ideas be tested in the marketplace. The idea being
government should not regulate speech. Now that's-it was a development for Holmes because as Judge Hand put it, for a very long time
Justice Holmes didn't get it. He didn't understand that the First
Amendment occupied a preferred position, that it was not just a right,
but, in fact, a necessary, as Meiklejohn put it, a necessary inference from
a democracy. We have to be able to speak.
At the time that I wrote this proposal, I was teaching the general First
Amendment class, and at the same time Congress was beginning serious

1. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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regulation of the Internet. So the two ideas came together obviously and
immediately. Does this notion of a marketplace of ideas make any sense
in this age of technology? And some might say it makes more sense now
than it did twenty years ago.
For some the marketplace of ideas is the fulfillment of the million
ideal that we simply leave people to make up their own minds. It's
clearly a libertarian idea. To others who have written in the last twenty
years or so, it's an oxymoron because, in an age in which money
determines access, the notion of a marketplace of ideas is one which is
so tilted in favor of the haves that it no longer makes any sense. The
metaphor doesn't make any sense. And I think that's what we will be
asking and talking about this weekend-is testing it.
Let me introduce some of the people who will be speaking, especially
tomorrow, because I'm going to leave for Dean Dessemthe introduction
of tonight's speaker. And this is really in order of the way they will
appear. The first speaker tomorrow morning at 9:00 or 9:30, I think 9
o'clock, will be Greg Lefevre, who is sitting over there. He is the CNN
Bureau Chief in San Francisco. And, so-he sits just above Silicon
Valley watching what's going on in this new generation of electronic
media and will present, I think, an overview of some of the big issues
that we will be tackling this weekend.
Following Greg Lefevre will be Margaret Chon from the University of
Seattle, a graduate of Cornell and the University of Michigan Law
School, who writes about intellectual property and in general about
access to this new media that seems to be taking over our lives.
Following Margaret Chon will be Daniel Jaffe. Dan is a graduate of
Princeton and the University of California. He is the Executive Vice
President for Governmental Relations for the Association of National
Advertisers. Every time you see one of those little banners on your AOL
or whatever else you're using for accessing the Internet, you can be
looking probably at one of Dan's clients. So clearly he has a-the people
he represents has a great stake in the kinds of regulation that will be
coming in the near future and that which is already upon us.
And, then, finally, Liza Kessler, a graduate of Smith and the
University of Wisconsin Law School, who is a counsel for the Center for
Democracy and Technology, a think tank in Washington, D.C., who has
spent the last couple of years in dealing in large part with privacy
issues. So I think all of these issues are the kinds of things that the
whole metaphor of the marketplace of ideas raises for us, and I am
extremely happy to have all of you with us for this weekend.
Keeping all of it together will be Sheri Lewis, whom most of you know,
Northwestern and NYU Law School, our Associate Librarian for
Research. And as most of you know, research, in fact, all of you know,
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research these days is about technology. Legal research is about
technology. So she has been in it from our point of view.
With that, let me bring up Dean Dessem to introduce our keynote
speaker.
DEAN DESSEM: Before I do that, I want to recognize and thank the
one person who wasn't thanked thus far, and that is Professor Ted
Blumoff, himself. As you will discover over this weekend, he has put
together and crafted a masterful proposal that was enthusiastically
welcomed by the Librarian of Congress, and you're going to see an
outstanding symposium this weekend as a result; so thank you, thank
you, Ted.
It is now my pleasant task and great honor to introduce this evening's
keynote speaker, Mr. Floyd Abrams. It's a great honor for us to host the
2000 Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lecture and Symposium, on which
Professor Blumoff and the Mercer Law Review have worked for quite
some time. It will be a very special weekend for us here at Mercer, and
we are honored by the fact that Floyd Abrams will present this evening's
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise lecture.
Mr. Abrams is a graduate of Cornell University and the Yale Law
School. He's a partner in the New York firm of Cahill, Gordon and is
the William J. Brennan, Jr. Visiting Professor of First Amendment Law
at the Columbia School of Journalism. In addition, Mr. Abrams has
been a visiting lecturer at both Yale and Columbia Law Schools, and he
is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers.
Floyd Abrams is the leading First Amendment attorney in the United
States, having argued more than one dozen First Amendment cases in
the United States Supreme Court, more than any attorney in American
History. He served as co-counsel in the Pentagon Papers2 case in the
1970s, and since that time he has represented the New York Times,
ABC, NBC, CBS, Time magazine, and various other print and electronic
media and media groups in precedent-setting First Amendment
litigation. Right now he represents CBS in litigation with the family of
Martin Luther King, Jr. in connection with a copyright infringement suit
filed by the family due to CBS's use of footage of Dr. King's "I Have a
Dream" speech in a documentary on the Civil Rights movement. In
addition to this First Amendment work, Floyd Abrams has handled at
least one ERISA case, has argued capital punishment cases in the
United States Supreme Court, and, just recently, represented Pepperidge

2.

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Farms in a trademark infringement case against RJR/Nabisco-charging
Nabisco with copying Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish cracker design.
The list of special awards that Mr. Abrams has earned and received
over the years is long and impressive. Perhaps even more impressive,
however, are the First Amendment precedents that he has helped to
establish through his advocacy over the last forty years. The cases in
which he has served as counsel truly define the First Amendment for all
courts and the protection of the First Amendment for all citizens during
the later portion of the Twentieth Century. These cases include The
Pentagon Papers' case, Branzburg v. Hayes,4 Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart,5 Landmark Communications v. Virginia,6 and Metromedia v.
City of San Diego.7 These are the cases that establish the First
Amendment protections that we all enjoy and that will guide courts and
legislatures as we enter the Twenty-First Century.
Mr. Abrams, you honor us with your presence tonight. Our Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise lecturer, Mr. Floyd Abrams.
MR. ABRAMS: Thank you. It's good to see you all. It's a great honor
to be invited here to talk to you, to talk with you, about, as I view it,
Justice Holmes, the First Amendment, the Internet and the relationship
of it all to each other.
I gave a talk a few weeks ago in New York at a church about various
First Amendment issues. We had a question period afterwards, and the
first question was what shall we do about John Rocker? I said, "Well,
we really don't have to do a whole lot about John Rocker." I said, "But
if you really want a First Amendment answer, put aside it's not the
government, if you want a First Amendment answer, why don't we really
try it in the old fashioned First Amendment way. We can boo. We can
leave him to his teammates' wrath." But, I said, "It does seem to be
getting a little bit out of control, I mean, sending him to psychiatric
wards." And then I said, "I'll tell you what I'll do, I'll go to Macon. I'll
do a personal investigation and I'll get back to you, and if there's
anything else to be done, I'll let you know." So I haven't learned
anything yet. There are no statues on the street.
I want to start by talking a little bit about Justice Holmes. It's,-I
can't tell you what a treat it is for a practicing lawyer, even one who
gets to do a good deal of First Amendment related work; and, therefore,

3. Id.
4. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
5. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
6. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
7. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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gets to write sometimes, not very often, in a style that lawyers can't use
too often, at least, gets sometimes to quote Supreme Court Justices
saying the sort of things that they don't say when they deal with the
Internal Revenue Code or certain other areas of law.
There are two passages of Justice Holmes' that have always struck me
with particular force. The first is this irresistibly solicitous and
absolutely First Amendment destructive phrase by Justice Holmes, one
of his best known, most repeated and most harmful, and that is, quote,
"the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting 'fire' in a theater and causing a panic."8
That's one of the best known phrases in American legal history. You
may not remember it quite the way I read it to you because I read it to
you correctly. Usually the word "falsely" is dropped completely from the
articulation. The causing of panic language is rarely cited. And
sometimes the word "crowded" is added as in the "no right to cry fire in
a crowded theater." Abby Hoffman, I thought, the great scholar of the
1970s put it best when he said, "freedom is the right to cry theater in a
crowded fire."
But it seems to me that the phrase is not only so quotable that it's
often misquoted, but so entrancing that it is used to justify just about
any restriction on free speech that happens to come to mind. And
Justice Holmes bears some responsibility for that.
The phrase was used in a case in which what was at issue was the
distribution of what we would now think of as a rather inoffensive
political leaflet urging people to join and support the Socialist Party and
to oppose conscription in World War I. It led to a conviction for
conspiracy to cause insubordination in the Armed Forces. And Holmes,
in an opinion written before the full blossoming of his First Amendment
views at a time when as has been said he didn't get it, wrote an opinion
justifying, affirming lawyers would say, the conviction. And in that
context, as Professor Harry Calvin has written, Holmes in a theater line
was so wholly apolitical one would have no idea that what was involved
was political speech. It not only lacked the complexity for dealing with
really serious speech, and the speech was serious speech in the Schenck
case in which it was used, but the fire in a crowded theater, and now
I've added "crowded," phrase did not even involve criticism of government at all, which is what that case was, after all, about. It was a
lovely phrase, a telling phrase, a mischievous phrase, but it's just too
good to forget.

8.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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Now, compare that magnificent miss with the dead on hit in the
Abramsg-no relation incidentally-case in which Holmes, with
eloquence about the First Amendment that I think no one before or after
has really ever matched, said in one paragraph the following: "Persecution," he said, "for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want
a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in
law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems
to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that
he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the
result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That,"
he said, "at any rate, that is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system, I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death unless they
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
of the law that an immediate check is required to save
pressing purposes
10
the country."
Now, that was one paragraph of the Abrams case. And it's that
unforgettable paragraph that really brings us here tonight and
tomorrow. We meet, really, to talk about the continuing relevance of
that language in our new cyberspace speech world.
But before we do, and we'll do more of that tomorrow than I'm doing
tonight, return with me for just a moment to the very beginning of
Holmes' great passage because it seems to me that one of the most
powerful things he has to teach us is that there is a terrible logic to
censorship. That it is undeniable, once you think about it, that if you
don't doubt, in Holmes' phrase, your premises, that there is an enormous
temptation to use power to suppress contrary speech, a temptation that
governments around the world throughout the history of the world have
often found to be irresistible.

9. 250 U.S. 616.
10. Id. at 630.
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I've quoted that passage in talks that I've given around the world,
including places where censorship is the norm and not the exception.
And my concern has always been, and remains, that the logic of
censorship, the appeal of censorship, the temptation of censorship, is
sometimes more powerful than any articulation, however eloquent, of its
risks.
Let me turn to a few issues involving the Internet and the new legal
world arising out of the Internet. New in one sense, but as I will argue
at least, not all that new in the First Amendment context.
First, it is a world in which our judges have fallen in love with the
Internet. They cannot say a bad word about it so far. Listen to the sort
of language federal judges use when they talk about the Internet. This
is language from the district court judge in ACLU v. Reno," writing on
the Internet in 1996 this way. Quote, "It is no exaggeration to conclude
that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most
participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-and indeed
the world-has yet seen. The plaintiffs in these actions correctly
describe the 'democratizing' effects of Internet communication:
individual citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience
on issues of concern to them. Federalists and Anti-Federalists may
debate the structure of their government nightly, but these debates occur
in newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in pamphlets. Modern-day
Luthers still post their theses, but to electronic bulletin boards rather
the door of the Wittenberg Schlosskirche. More mundane (but from a
constitutional perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs between
aspiring artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers or fly fisherman." 12 And
the judge went on, "true it is that many find some of the speech on the
Internet to be offensive, and amid the din of cyberspace may hear
discordant voices that they regard as indecent. The absence of
governmental regulation of Internet content has unquestionably
produced a kind of chaos, but as one of plaintiffs' experts put it with
such resonance at the hearing: '[w]hat achieved success was the very
chaos that the Internet is, the strength of the Internet is that chaos.'
Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our
liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech
the First Amendment protects." 13
And then when the case went to the Supreme Court, 4 Justice
Stephens, writer for the Court, said, "Through the use of chat rooms, any

11.

929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Penn. 1996).

12. Id. at 881.
13. Id. at 883.
14. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of
Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups the same individual can
become a pamphleteer."15 According to Justice Stephens, "[the Internet] provides relatively unlimited low cost capacity for communication
of all kinds." 6 It is a "vast democratic fora."17 And I agree with all
of that.
But I must express at the start a few qualms, some of which are of a
sort of personal nature. As you may have heard from my biography, at
least if you tone down the compliments and ask, well, what does this
man do for a living-a lot of what I do is representing newspapers,
journalists, broadcasters and the like. And I must tell you that I am just
a tad put out that my clients don't fare as well when I come to court as
the Internet does when lawyers comes to court representing it. I just
can't help but think that many judges are far more comfortable with the
notion of citizen Internet users than of trained editors or writers on the
Net or off. Sometimes it seems to be counter-intuitive. I mean it can't
really be, can it, that we should honor Matt Drudge more than Dan
Rather, or Pierre Salinger, with his TWA plane hundred fantasies, over
the New York Times news gathering operations? Yet it does seem to me
that some of the judicial rapture over the Internet sounds that way.
And I think it can lead to some interesting and perhaps troubling
problems.
The first arises out of one of the most attractive features of the
Internet. It is that the low entry barriers allow everyone to be a
publisher. The good side of that is obvious. Is there a less good one?
Let me offer you the perspective that I usually do when I'm in court
representing my clients of the press. When a prosecutor or defense
counsel seeks to require a journalist to reveal their confidential source
of information, I usually turn to a state statute, if there is one, which
protects the relationship ofjournalist and source. Or if there is none, or
the statute is too narrow, or the statute is inapplicable, as in Federal
Court, very often I will turn to the First Amendment itself. And I argue
the press can't gather news if it cannot promise confidentiality to its
sources. The public will suffer, I and my colleagues who make these
arguments make, if newspapers and broadcasters and journalists and
the like can't meaningfully promise people confidentiality in return for
information.

15. Id. at 870.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 868.
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This is the way the great Yale law professor, Alexander Bickle, argued
the need for First Amendment protection of this sort in a brief submitted
on behalf of many newspapers and broadcasters in the only Supreme
Court case yet to pass on this, Branzburg v. Hayes."s Bickle wrote,
"reporters are able to get much indispensable information only on the
understanding that confidence may be reposed in them because they can
and will keep confidences. Such indispensable information comes in
confidence from office holders fearful of superiors, from businessmen
fearful of competitors, from informers operating at the edge of the law
who are in danger of reprisals from criminal associates, from people
afraid of the law and of the government, sometimes rightly afraid, but
as often from an excess of caution, and from men and women in all fields
anxious not to incur censure for unorthodox or unpopular views, whether
their views would be considered unorthodox and be unpopular at large
or merely in their own group or subculture."
"The assurance of confidentiality," Bickle wrote, "elicits valuable
background information in important diplomatic labor negotiations and
in many similar situations where disclosure would adversely affect the
informant's bargaining position. Public figures of all sorts, including
government officials, political candidates, corporate officers, labor
leaders, movie stars, baseball heros who will speak in public only in
carefully guarded words achieve a more informative candor in private
communications."
Well, now, in the Branzburg case itself, the Supreme Court, in a five
to four ruling, required journalists to reveal their sources, at least in a
grand jury context, where the grand jury was investigating possible
criminal misconduct. 19 In later cases, particularly but not exclusively,
in civil cases, significant First Amendment protection had been found
present for the purpose of protecting confidential journalistic sources.
And a three-part balancing test has generally been applied which is hard
to beat.
Journalistic work product itself has also been often held to be
privileged under the First Amendment, even when it's not contextual,
the notes journalists take when they interview people, so as to protect
what one recent ruling called the paramount public interest in the
maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press.
The Department of Justice has adopted guidelines which it follows and
which require the personal approval of the Attorney General herself, and
these were adopted first under Attorney General John Mitchell under
President Nixon, incidentally, but have been reaffirmed as part of the
18. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
19. Id. at 708.
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Department of Justice practice ever since-personal approval of the
Attorney General before any attempts are made to cause journalists to
respond to compulsory process by the Department of Justice. First, you
have to go to alternative sources, nonjournalists. Then, you have to have
a really compelling need for the information. The guidelines say, quote,
"freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of reporters to
investigate and report for the news."
Now, all these First Amendment protections, for confidential and
nonconfidential materials alike, are rooted in the special needs of the
press, and the special role of the press in American lives.
Question-Will the same protections be afforded to each and every
publisher who has a Web site, or to put the question more narrowly, will
everyone who has a Web site be treated the same as every reporter with
regard to the matters that I've been talking about?
Now, I am concerned about this topic, whatever the answer to that
question. If, as I doubt, Internet publishers are provided less right than
newspaper publishers, can that be justified? But maybe worse yet,
suppose the law is said to be the same for all, quote, "publishers":
unquote, Internet, newspaper, whatever, what level of protection will
that law provide?
Thus far those of us who have practiced in this area have sought to
justify First Amendment protection for journalists based upon something
rather unique that we have argued that they do as fact finders, as fact
revealers, in newspapers, on television and the like. We've analogized
the need for this protection to the need for protection of attorney and
client, the need for protection for priests and penitent and the like, but
we have never thought, I had never imagined that the courts would ever
be persuaded to permit everybody who speaks, everybody that is, to
promise everybody else confidentiality. The very fact, then, that
everyone can be a publisher may leave no one to be treated as a matter
of First Amendment law the way publishers have historically been
treated.
Let me offer another example. Toward the end of the last year, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Philadelphia decided an
interesting case in which the issue was whether the First Amendment
precluded the imposition of civil damages for the disclosure of a tape
recording of an intercepted telephone conversation.2 ° The conversation
contained information of public significance. The defendants were two
radio stations, their reporter and the person who furnished the tape

20. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999).
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recorder. None of them had anything to do with listening to the
conversation.2
What happened was a tape recording was made by someone, we don't
know who, of a conversation on the telephone between two union leaders
who were negotiating on behalf of the teachers union. One of the
speakers was the president of the union, the other the chief negotiator.
And in their call one said to the other, quote, "If they're not going to
[make their offer higher], we're going to have to go to their, their homes
to blow ...

off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some

of those guys," unquote,22 and there was more of the same.
Some unknown person intercepted and recorded the conversation and
left it in the mailbox of an association that opposed the teachers' union
and the teachers getting more money. He gave it to a radio station. The
radio station played it on the air. The lawsuit was brought by the two
union officials under Federal and State wire tapping laws that make it
illegal to listen to and to reveal such discussions. The legal issue, what
about third parties; and, in particular, what about the press when the
press in this case broadcast this information that had been made
available to them, which they obtained perfectly legally, didn't pay
anybody, didn't ask anyone to get it, and then played it on the radio.
Could the press, then, or the radio station, be liable for disclosing it?2"
The Third Circuit held that the statute could not constitutionally be
applied to the press.24 Distinguishing a recent and nearly identical
ruling to the contrary by the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia in Washington on the ground, in part, that the press was not
involved in that case, the court held the statute unconstitutional as
applied to the press.2 5
Now, I didn't come here tonight to argue about whether that was the
correct ruling, although it has its appeal to me. But I do raise with you
the same issue I raised earlier. Would an Internet publisher, anyone
with a Web site that is, be treated the same; and, if so, what difference
does the press status of the defendant make? And, if not, how can we
justify the difference?
My own views in this area have been much affected by the writings of
former Justice Potter Stewart who frequently urged that the press clause
of the First Amendment, quote, "Congress shall make no law abridging
freedom of speech or of the press," unquote, that the press words in the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 113.
at 113, 116.
at 129.
at 128-29.
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First Amendment exist to afford what he called the institutional press
with more and somewhat different rights than those set forth in the
speech clause of the First Amendment. That position has not fared well
with the Supreme Court, although as I have already indicated there is
no doubt that in some areas that the press has fared better in court than
it would have done simply because of its role in American life. It would
certainly be disturbingly ironic if the rapid expansion of the Internet as
a means of communication diminished the degree of First Amendment
protection of the press; and, thereby, inflicted serious harm to the public.
There's a second area in which the Internet undoubtedly serves us
well but I think in which we should think seriously about its consequences. One of the great things about the Net and about all our
modern technology in this area is the far greater ease that is now
provided to assemble information and to make it publicly available on
a wide scale basis cheaply. That result is entirely consistent with the
First Amendment. But, paradoxically, the effect of more information
being made more available more quickly, more cheaply may be less
information being made public in the first place.
Consider the initial response you may have read about last week in
the newspaper of the Judicial Conference of the United States to the
efforts of an on-line news service to post the information that is set forth
in the supposedly public disclosure forms filed by federal judges setting
forth their stock holdings and their family assets. This is material
which by statute is supposed to be, quote, "public," unquote. And it's
been public but hard to get, a pain to obtain. Forms to be filled out.
Disclosures to be made by the people who want the information in ways
that make it something less than easy to obtain.
Now comes an Internet news service saying to the Judicial Conference,
"Just give us all your forms and we'll post them. Thank you very much."
To which the initial response of the committee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States when confronted with complaints from judges
allegedly on personal security grounds, but more plausibly, I think, on
personal privacy grounds, was to say, "We're not going to make any of
it public to the Internet. No, we'll leave it here. You can come and you
can read it and you can write it down with that what used to be called
a pencil, but not on the Internet." Now, this is by judges in the face of
specific statutory language saying that this is public.
Last Wednesday, day before yesterday, after a rebuke by Chief Justice
Rehnquist of a public nature, the Judicial Conference reversed field and
agreed to make the information public even to an Internet entity.
Or consider this one, there is what is known as worst case chemical
disaster information and there is now legislation about that information.
There is a law that is officially now known as the Chemical Safety
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Information Site Security and Regulatory Relief Act, which was a
response to regulations enacted under the Clean Air legislation that
required chemical companies to report worst case scenario information
to the EPA, which the agency was to put on the Web by June 21, 1999.
Congressional Republicans asserted fear of the potential for terrorists
finding the information on the Web and amendments were made to the
disclosure requirements. But look at the amendments. The Act now not
only restricts Internet access to information regarded, quote, "the
potential threat from hazardous materials stored at an estimated 66,000
companies," but it also prohibits the public from getting worst case
scenario data on paper by exempting in toto the public records from
disclosure laws established under the Freedom of Information Act.
Specifically, the bipartisan compromise, in effect now law, places a one
year moratorium on distribution of worst case scenario information to
the general public everywhere, not just on the Internet, and requires the
Administration to promulgate regulations on the dissemination of worst
case scenarios to the public after performing two separate assessments;
one, the risk of terrorist activity associated with the posting of information on the Net and the other, the incentives created by public disclosure
of worst case scenarios for reduction of the risk of accidental releases.
Criminal fines of up to one million dollars have been adopted for willful
violation of the Act's information restriction.
There's a somewhat ironic postscript to the Act in that three months
after its passage, a public interest group posted summaries of all the
worst case scenario information available from the EPA on its Web site.
Il come back a little bit later to the difficulty of stopping information
from getting out, whatever legislation you pass.
Other examples of Internet motivated restrictions of public information include an initiative by Massachusetts business leaders to, quote,
"make it easier for companies to have information declared a trade
secret," unquote, in response to the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection, putting previously available chemical
companies chemical usage information on its Web site. Proposed
legislation in Illinois that would make it a misdemeanor to use the
Internet to transmit information about marijuana or other controlled
substances knowing that the information will be used in furtherance of
illegal activity. And the U.S. Parole Commission's approval of potential
restrictions on the use of computers by federal parolees.
None of this, of course, is an argument against more access generally,
let alone against the great features of the Net, but have led, however
understandably, those who are the subjects of Internet data to seek to
avoid the data being compiled at all.
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But listen to an editorial published this week by the Reporters'
Committee for Freedom of the Press which concluded this, predicted this.
Quote, "legislatures nationwide are considering measures that would
shut down access to any public record that identifies an individual that
is sold to a commercial entity or provided to a mass public." How, the
editorial asks. How did this steady erosion of access to public documents
happen? Because in the computer age, data held by state agencies that
for decades was open to the public suddenly became useful, and once it
became useful, people started using it. In coming months, they predict,
watch for legislative and Congressional efforts to close voter registration,
property tax and land transaction records.
Now, I said earlier that it would be disturbingly ironic if the "everyone
is a publisher" feature of the Internet ultimately leads to all publishers
having less in the way of First Amendment rights. As to this second
possible result, less information being made public, if the price of that
is Internet level distribution, I'm not as disturbed, but the result
certainly is ironic.
Finally, there are other costs, costs of a different sort, costs-and those
of us who toil on the First Amendment legal vineyards rarely acknowledge, but I thought in honor of Justice Holmes I would at least refer to.
For the Internet is not only, in Justice Stephens' phrase, a vast
democratic fora, it is a fora which tests our continuing devotion to the
First Amendment. The problem is not Matt Drudge or Pierre Salinger,
it is everything, because if everything, or just about everything, is now
to be made available on the Net, we ought to face up to the consequences.
Here's one. There has been an explosion on the Net of Nazi-like, Ku
Klux Klan-like speech, hate speech, and then some, which we are busily
and instantaneously exporting to the rest of the world. In the rest of the
world, that information tends to be illegal. Here it would be protected
under the First Amendment, and I agree with the protection, but look
what happens. It is not that that speech didn't exist here or that we
didn't protect it before the Internet, it did exist, we did protect it, but
like everything in the pre-Internet world, it was harder to get it out,
often impossible to do so on a large scale basis. Now it is possible and
it is happening. The Steven Weisenthall Center has identified 1,400
such sites in a recent report, more than double last year's.
And one of the leading extremists on the World Wide Web, the founder
of the publication, Storm Front, has said that, quote, "The benefit is that
we reach tens of thousands of people, potentially millions." It's almost
like having a TV network. That is First Amendment language. It
happens to be First Amendment language in the service of evil, but it is
First Amendment language.
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And all the advances of the Internet about which I have previously
spoken have contributed to this. The ease with which one can participate, the low cost of participation, the easy availability of information
and the like. And what that means in the area of hate speech is that
there has been a sort of resurgence of the widespread dissemination of
ugly and sometimes dangerous views that have historically been
constitutionally protected here but not much seen, and now they are
seen by more people in this country and abroad.
The same is true of pornographic material, including child pornography. When Tme magazine published an article on child pornography in
1995 based on an article in the Georgetown Law Journal that claimed
that there were 917,000 pornographic files on the Web, the magazine
was justly criticized for its analysis of the data presented. But I think
what should not be in dispute now is that there was in 1995-there is
far more today-available on the Net of a sort that almost all parents
would find to be extraordinarily disturbing for their children. The most
current statistical data that I've seen, itself about half a year out of date,
indicates that the publicly indexable World Wide Web now contains
about 800 million pages on about 3 million circuits of about, of which
about 1.5 percent, that is to say, 12 million pages, contain pornography.
And it is preposterous to deny this.
We can talk about what we can do about it. Higher degrees of
parental involvement. Use of filtering devices. The use of the criminal
law to punish the dissemination of information that is genuinely
unprotected by the First Amendment. But it is simply inaccurate to
deny the new reality that if in Justice Stephens' words, "any person with
a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soap box,"2" that the town criers now include
Nazis and pornographers. That doesn't change my view of the First
Amendment and I think it should not change yours, but it is true.
None of the new technological innovations, I think, should make
anything that Justice Holmes said any less powerful than when he said
it. If anything, what may be most different now from then is our
technological inability, or at least the extraordinary difficulty in stifling
speech, even if we wanted to do so.
I gave a speech a few years ago at the law school in Kuala Lampur in
Malaysia. Like many authoritarian countries around the world, but
particularly ones with large Muslim populations, Malaysia had banned
the sale of Salman Rushdie's book, The Satanic Verses. In an effort at
international comity, and maybe in my own safety, I didn't say a word

26. 521 U.S. at 870.
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about the book during my speech about free expression. When I
finished, I said, as we are about to do here, "Anybody have any
questions?" The first question was, "Did you read the Rushdie book?"
I lied and said, "Yes, I read it." And the second question was, "Did you
like the book?" And the third question was, "Should the book be
banned?" And I finally turned to them and I said, "Look, this book is
banned here. It is a crime for you to, for anyone to sell it. It is a crime
for you to buy it. For all I know, it's even a crime for you to ask me
about it. How do you even know about the book?" This is eight years
ago, to which, as one-they all said, "CNN." Now, that was in preInternet days. I mean, almost a full ten years ago, that is what they
were saying.
And it seems to me that what was true then is already far truer now,
it is almost impossible to stop the spread of information, good information, bad information, useful information, dangerous information. One
would have to live in a country with a degree of ruthlessness and
technological know-how, willingness to be ruthless and a high level of
technological know-how, to cut back on what the Internet is doing,
mostly, for obvious reasons, mostly for the good in getting information
out. And it's very hard these days, and will be harder still in the future,
to do just that.
There is something else that was also true just those few years ago
when I was in Malaysia that was also true when Justice Holmes said it
and that remains true today, and that's what I started talking with you
about today. There is a logic that sometimes seems to justify censorship,
at least to people in power, and there's also a history that tells us that
the path of censorship is a path that leads inexorably to an end to
freedom.
Our judges will stop loving the Internet soon enough when they start
seeing some of the material on the Internet that most of them are wholly
unaware of at this moment. And when that happens, and when the
fight begins of a serious sort about the freedom of the Internet, it seems
to me that we should keep recalling, maybe even quote to ourselves now
and then, the sort of language that I read to you from that single
paragraph of Justice Holmes' earlier articulations which allow limitations on speech only when an immediate check is required to save the
country, language which permits limitations on speech even in crowded
theater circumstances only when it would itself cause immediate panic
or the like. And in the end we could all do worse than to remind
ourselves now and then, as Justice Holmes did, that the ultimate good
is better reached by the free trade and ideas than any other way. Thank
you very much.
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I would be glad to do questions on anything from John Rocker to
Justice Holmes in and around the First Amendment area if anybody has
any.
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: In what is now Russia, we are
hearing that the government there is employing spies to monitor the
Internet traffic in and out. A moment ago you were talking about
ruthlessness and technological know-how. Could that survive? Could
that actually come to happen in a country that size?
MR. ABRAMS: I'm not technologically knowledgeable enough to know
what is possible by way of intrusion and the level of technological
sophistication to do it. The question, for those of you back there, was
whether if in Russia, say, a genuine effort was made to find out who the
source was of Internet postings, whether it could work from a technological point of view, and from that point of view I really don't know.
Obviously, we are trying here to learn about our hackers and who they
are and the like, and I suspect that some of the technology of trying to
find out is not dissimilar. But I have heard that in China, for example,
where the Chinese have made a serious effort to crack down on the use
of the Internet, that the kids are just too smart, that these are-the
people trying to crack down do not have the immediate firsthand
knowledge of how to prevent being caught that people who have grown
up, or started to grow up, on the Internet have; and, so, I think, we
already see the beginning of a different sort of class warfare, adults and
children, in which the children will win.
PROFESSOR BLUMOFF: In reference to a point that you were
raising before about the rapture with the Internet and its obvious and
perhaps perceived as largely harmless democratizing potential on one
hand with the equally obvious apprehension of what's shown in recent
years with traditional media, and that, also, with its unwillingness, at
least until recently, to deal with campaign finance issues, all of which
deal with this notion of democracy and its potential in whether it's
harmless or not, does that make sense to you?
MR. ABRAMS: I understand the question. I have to offer my views
in sections. I think that what judges don't like about journalists is what
most people don't like about journalists. They seem arrogant, they seem
presumptuous, they seem to be sitting in judgment on everyone else
other than themselves, and I think these are particularly bad days for
journalists vis-a-vis the public. I think, for example, that journalists will
pay a heavy price for many years for their coverage of the Clinton-
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Monica scandal. For one thing, they've lost their last constituency,
liberals who support the President. But more than that, I think that the
degree to which journalists strutted with false notes of piety, journalists,
some of whom I represent, who have occasionally had affairs themselves
and lied about them, did not play well with the public. I think that it's
going to be very hard to deal with that for a lot of reasons. One of them
is that there is a lot of reason to be upset at some journalistic behavior.
What concerns me more is that even when journalists act at their best,
make their greatest contributions to the public, they don't seem to get
an awful lot of credit for having done so. There was a time when they
did, but that time is not now.
Now, as regards campaign finances, I have-I should say, in that
speech I told you about that I gave at this church a few weeks ago, this
was a very friendly group of people who probably shared social, political,
cultural attitudes to a high degree. New York City, liberal, smart. The
sort of people I'd like to hang around with and that I'm very comfortable
with. And one of the questions I got was, "It's all very easy for you to
talk like this in front of us. Why don't you say something some of us
might disagree with because all your examples so far have been
examples of people trying to suppress speech that all of us would
disagree with. Give us some example of some First Amendment topic
where we will all disagree with you." And I said, "Campaign finance,
because I am one of the people who continues to be of the view that
there are very strong First Amendment barriers to the sort of campaign
finance reform that is sought by people who tend to be my political soul
mates." That is to say, I know why Senator McConnell says what he
does about it, but I think he's more right than the people that I agree
with politically. And, so, when I hear talk about closing up the
loopholes, and the loopholes are real, and the impact of money on politics
is often terrible, my first response is that they better be very careful
because they are treading very deeply into what I recognize, at least I
view, as protected First Amendment activity. There are things I can
think of to do which would cushion that conflict, including public
funding, including public-required public disclosure of certain things,
but for myself, new legislation which significantly cuts back on what I
view as the ability of people, even rich people, to participate in the
political process as they wish to do so, is dangerous from a First
Amendment perspective.
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: In many countries, in an attempt to
distinguish the legitimate press from everyone else, they issue credentials to journalists, and that has from time to time been done here. My
questions to you are two. First, is that not in and of itself a form of
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censorship? And, second, how do you suggest that we distinguish the
legitimate press in the way that encourages a vigorous media for the
country; and, yet, doesn't extend as you talked about, those protections
to everyone, to many people who don't understand the ethical issues of
balanced sources, fairness?
MR. ABRAMS: A very good and powerful question. First, I think
licensing of journalists is in all likelihood unconstitutional, even as
viewed by people who disagree with me constitutionally. I should say-I
must say parenthetically before I go on, one of my favorite cartoons I
used to have on my wall was an old New Yorker cartoon which showed
the people on the Supreme Court all sitting around together, and one of
them turns to another and says, "Do you ever have a day when
everything seems unconstitutional?" I really try not to sound that way.
So, licensing I think is bad. And, indeed, I did a brief some years ago
before the Inter-American Court of Justice in Costa Rica arguing that a
policy in Venezuela of licensing journalists violated international
principles of free expression, and the court did say that.
The much harder question for me is what to do, how to raise
standards, how to teach better, how to recognize more within the press
and within a new community of people who are beginning to communicate on a widespread basis. First, the new people don't think of
themselves as, quote, "journalists." I'm not talking about whether
they're flattering or condemning. They often think they're talking to
each other. I mean I've gotten calls from people who have gotten sued
for libel for e-mail communications who had no idea that anybody could
sue them. They think of it as if it's a telephone call, and the only
difference legally is that no one knows what you say in a telephone call.
It is like a telephone call, but if someone can prove that you say
something defamatory in a telephone call, you can get sued there for
libel just as well. So there's a whole new class of people out there that
will need you all as lawyers, and I want you to be happy about that.
Improving the standards is the hardest and the most important. One
of the things that I think that the old-fashioned press does least well is
to talk about what it does best, that is to say, in part for fear of seeming
to crow too much about their good things, they wind up simply doing
good and bad things and never distinguishing.
A newspaper in Texas won the Pulitzer Prize a few years ago, a Fort
Worth paper, for doing this series of articles about how particular
helicopters that were being used in training by the military were unsafe.
Over 160 American young men had died in helicopter classes in training
class. Management of the company boycotted the newspaper by cutting
out all ads. The union for which the workers in the company with which
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they are associated urged their workers not to buy the paper. The paper
suffered considerably financially as a result of doing something which
was only good. It did win a Pulitzer Prize. The Pulitzer Prize was a one
day story mostly in that paper only because the press isn't very good at
celebrating what the press does that is worth doing. Sometimes, I know,
sometimes they celebrate too much, but that's pretty rare. And I think
the beginning of improving standards is to recognize when something
has been well done as opposed to being badly done.
A second thing is for the press to engage in more self-criticism. Now,
it does do more of that than it used to do. It does it in a few different
ways. One can now find editorials in newspapers, rarely but sometimes,
which criticize the coverage of certain things by other newspapers or
broadcasters.
When Time magazine was sued back in the 1980s for an article
accusing the then Israeli Defense Minister Sharon of purposely
fermenting the massacre that occurred in Southern Lebanon, which it
seems he did not do, the New York Times had an editorial criticizing
Time not so much for the article, but for defending the article to the end
of the earth legally and for never admitting that it had erred. I thought
that was an important journalistic step for the better.
Then sometimes journalistic organizations, generally in extremis, ask
outsiders to come in and have a look at their work. That's what Gannet
had to do last year when a Cincinnati newspaper owned by them did a
large, highly publicized, story about Chiquita, a story which may have
been true and which was based, or may not, but which was based on
information that was illegally obtained and as to which the journalist
lied to his superiors about the method of obtaining it. They did an
enormous amount of internal work after the fact, finding out how it
came about, adopted new publicly disclosed standards written in lay
English, the way real people speak to each other, setting forth their
standards for the future. For example, we will never deceive people
about who we are.
Now, I have defended, and meant it, the proposition that journalists
sometimes have served the public well by not always fully disclosing who
they are. My point now is simply that when Gannet took a hard look at
its behavior in this situation where they came out was to say, never, this
is a policy from now on, when we call we will say we work for the
CincinnatiInquirer,nothing else, nothing different, et cetera.
And then, on a personal level, CNN asked me a few years ago to look
into the story that it had done on the Tailhook matter, a situation where
CNN did a very major report saying that the United States during the
war in Vietnam had engaged in activities in Laos which were at least
palpably illegal if they had occurred, including deliberately killing
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Americans who were prisoners of war of the Vietnamese and were acting
in some complicit way with the Vietnamese. The basic charge in this
piece was that the U.S. had used a sort of nerve gas in Laos.
CNN was accused of having put material on which was untrue. There
was a great furor about it. CNN decided to go outside CNN, and in that
case asked me to have a look at the outtakes, interview anyone I wanted
to interview, write a report, which was made public. The report
concluded that CNN did not have an appropriate basis for making those
charges. CNN should apologize to the troops that were in that unit and
do a formal public apology about the piece on the air, which it did, and
did again around the world for, I think for a full 24-hour cycle over and
over again withdrawing its piece.
I take a lesson from that, incidentally. The lesson is that journalistic
organizations don't suffer when they admit error, even egregious error,
and that they only benefit; and, of course, we only benefit when, if they
do something wrong, even embarrassingly wrong, they just 'fess up to it
and say so.
Those are some of the things I think that have to be done, but one can
go on forever about it.
PROFESSOR CHON: I'd like to go back to your observations about
hate speech on the Internet in that I suspect that everyone in this room
has an opinion about it-they don't want it to happen, but I think there
might be a difference of opinion about whether R.A.V u. City of St.
Paul27 was correctly decided. I'm concerned about the exporting of our

First Amendment jurisprudence in this particular area. I think
oftentimes when we think about censorship occurring in other countries
we think about extreme examples like Malaysia, Singapore, and China,
but, in fact, other western democracies have found it a very legitimate
balancing interent to say this is the kind of speech we find unacceptable
for reasons of human equality, human dignity, and we don't have that
balancing, at least with our current Supreme Court. So how would you,
I see a very imperialistic brouhaha for us to export that particular view
of speech to the rest of the world. And I'd like your comments on that.
MR. ABRAMS: Let me summarize the question just in case you all
didn't get all of it, and you all didn't hear everything. It really relates
to the exporting, a phrase that I used also, of American First Amendment norms around the world. We're the only democratic country to
speak of, that protects what we've been referring to as hate speech.

27. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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Canada, England, France, Germany all make it a crime to engage in
speech which demeans someone simply based upon race, religion,
national origin, et cetera. The et cetera differs country to country, but
at least those are similar.
The question was isn't it sort of an unjust expansion of our own
sovereignty to insist, as it were, that the world adhere to our First
Amendment standards in this area.
My own view is this. First, I'm not critical of foreign countries that
take stances on free expression which are not as expansive, not as
protective, as ours. They come from different cultures, they have
different views, and it seems to me that while there is certain speech
which ought to be protected everywhere, and although I think we are
right for us in protecting almost all speech here, I don't think other
countries misbehave when they come out differently than we do in some
areas like this.
There's a problem, though. The problem is in part one of technology.
Someone's law is going to govern in a real politic way about what is said.
That is to say it will either be the country with the least or the most
restrictive protection of free expression. An example before we get to
hate speech. A few years ago, the British sent lawyers literally around
the world trying to suppress a book which describes secrets of MI-5, the
British CIA, and described activities that the British had engaged in
which would ordinarily be viewed as improper and outrageous. These
were engaged in by intelligence operatives from their country at the
request of their country. It was a national policy to do these things.
The book got out. It got out because it got here. As soon as it's here,
the game is over. You don't need an Internet. There was no Internet
then. There were book sales, and people from the UK would bring it
back to their country. But when you think about it, the purpose there
was never about protecting lives or anything. Once the book was out,
any threats that existed were there. Any confidences that were blown
were blown. If the problem was that the Russians, then, would learn
these secrets, the fact that this book was sold widely in the U.S. made
that inevitable.
Nonetheless, they sent their lawyers out representing the Crown to
Australia, to Hong Kong, to South Africa and to friendly venues, they
thought, around the world, and the general answer wasn't that the U.S.
law governs, it was that it was useless. There was no secret anymore.
The book was out. The secrets were public. If you can catch someone
who said it, do what you want to him. But you can't suppress the book.
Another way to say that is that our law won. It won because it was
legal to publish it here, and because it would have been hopeless under
our law for them to have come to an American court and sought a prior
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restrain against publication of this book. That's our First Amendment
law. And, so, the bottom line there was whatever the other equities
might have been, however strongly they felt about it, however much they
wanted to make a point about it, it wouldn't work. It was all useless.
Now we come to hate speech. I think we get the same result in hate
speech, subject to one important caveat. We get the same result in that
it's legal here-someone puts it on the Web page here, it's out. There it
is.
The caveat is the entities at risk in Bavaria, say, which sought to
prosecute Prodigy for doing just that, were not the people that put it on
Web sites, but Prodigy or AOL or the entities that do business in
Germany and were subject to process in Germany, the carriers, as it
were, of these views. Now, for most of us that did raise serious First
Amendment problems, First Amendment-like problems at least, and that
is could it really be that an American entity running an essentially
American operation was at risk of criminal prosecution in a foreign
country for doing something which is perfectly legal here. Now, that is
by no means a question to which the answer is legally clear. In fact, I
suspect the real answer is the State of Bavaria was free legally to do
whatever it wanted. I mean, it's not that we were going to send a group
of judges over there to limit them. So they could have done whatever
they wanted. They decided, for reasons of relationship with the U.S., not
to do it.
So I mean, my own view, then, is that as a general matter, because we
are the most permissive or, if you will, the most speech protective
country in the world, that in light of the developing technology that has
occurred, our culture, for better or worse, is likely to, and, in fact, has
been, sweeping the world. It's one of the reasons a lot of countries are
so disturbed at the United States, not just the degree of control, power
we have, but because our ideas, even at their vilest, are being routinely
sent around the world with not a whole lot that people can effectively do
about it.
Whether there is some way to negotiate out these issues, whether
there are some technological changes, whether there are in the future to
be filtering devices of a magnitude at this point unknown and unknowable, I just don't know. I suspect what will happen is that we will
continue, not by virtue of any government decision, but just by virtue of
the nature of the technology that exists and that will exist, and the law
that protects the activity here, to continue to have enormous impact,
probably disproportionate impact, on what the world gets to see and
read.
Let me do a last question.
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QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: I'm interested in your comment
about the favorable treatment of the Internet of the judiciary. And, in
particular, at one point you said that if the judges knew more of what
was on the Internet, they might change their views. Are you suggesting
that judges are ignorant of what's on the Internet or is there some other
reason that you can point to as to why there's been favorable treatment
given that media?
MR. ABRAMS: I think the judges are favorable about the Internet
because they view it just as they're saying, as an enormous progress in
democracy. I think on a more impressionistic nature, the judges are
especially taken with the Internet because everyone's views on the
Internet is in a sense, and this will not continue, and I don't even believe
it's true now, but everyone's views on the Net are equal because a Web
site is a Web site is a Web site, and because they are disturbed at what
they view as the misbehavior and enormously overdone degree of power,
as they view it, of the American press. So that's where I'm starting
from.
The comment I made earlier, though, comes from my sense that it is
uncommon for people who are on the Supreme Court, I'm thinking not
parenthetically I've got to go back there so I have to be relatively
restrained in a Holmes appearance, but I don't think they know what's
out there anymore than I think they know what happens in trial courts.
Thank you very much.
MS. BROWN: Good evening, everyone. My name is Elizabeth Brown
and I'm the Lead Articles Editor of the Mercer Law Review, and on
behalf of the Law Review I'd like to thank you all for joining us tonight.
And I would also like to thank Mr. Abrams for being with us tonight and
sharing his thoughts with us on this very important and interesting
topic. At this time we'd like to present him with a gift as a token of our
appreciation for joining us. We hope it will help him remember this
event. Thank you very much.
Ms. Chon, Mr. Jaffe, Ms. Kessler, and Mr. Lefevre will be engaging
each other in a panel discussion tomorrow starting at 9 o'clock at the
Medical School Auditorium, and we hope you will all join us tomorrow
for a continuation of this discussion. Thank you and have a nice
evening.
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